I am an applied microeconomist studying health economics, development economics, and industrial organization.
I am currently a postdoc jointly funded by Harvard Kennedy School and Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health.
My research focuses on the roles of the government and the private sector in health care, health insurance, and health systems broadly.
Working Papers:
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Public Hospitals as Strategic Subsidies for Private Healthcare
In developing countries, healthcare markets increasingly consist of public and private providers. How should the government make public investments when anticipating private entrants? I study this question in the Malaysian hospital market between 1980 and 2014. Stacked event studies show that new public hospitals increase private entry by 34 percent within the same district due to labor force complementarities. Using electronic health records and administrative data, I estimate a structural model that separates three channels of agglomeration benefits--labor market spillovers, public hospital congestion, and changes in demand. Counterfactual simulations show urban districts benefit from smaller specialist public hospitals to crowd-in private entrants, while taxing private entrants to internalize agglomeration benefits. Channeling additional tax revenue to rural districts improves overall welfare.
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Politicians and Bureaucratic Planning: Evidence from Malaysian Hospitals (In Review)
[ Abstract ] [ Draft ] - Comments welcome!I study how politicians and bureaucrats influence the allocation of public hospitals in Malaysia between 1959 and 2013. Exploiting differences in electoral seat and hospital district boundaries, I show that politicians distort hospital locations towards constituencies with deputy ministers. Political distortions occur during the construction stage but not during funding decisions. Using a simple model, I show that bureaucrats have higher bargaining power than politicians in funding decisions relative to hospital locations. Anecdotal evidence attribute these effects to codified bureaucratic guidelines. These results show how bureaucratic rules in allocating public goods during the planning stage can mitigate political distortions.
Publications:
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Consumer Choice and Public-Private Providers: The Role of Perceived Prices (with Wei Aun Yap and Winnie Yip). Health Economics 2022.
Governments often encourage health service providers to improve quality of care and reduce prices through competition. The efficacy of competition hinges on the assumption that consumers demand high quality care at low prices for any given health condition. In this paper, we examine this assumption by investigating the role of perceived price and quality on consumer choice for four different health conditions across public and private providers. We use a nationally representative survey in Malaysia to elicit respondents' perception on prices and quality, and their preferred choice of provider. We estimate a mixed logit model and show that consumers value different dimensions of quality depending on the health condition. Furthermore, increasing perceived prices for private providers reduces demand for minor, more frequent health conditions such as flu fever or cough, but increases demand for more complex, severe conditions such as coronary artery bypass graft. These findings provide empirical support for price regulation which differentiates the severity of underlying health conditions.
Selected Work-In-Progress:
- Strategic Auto-Enrollment and Market Design (with Mark Shepard and Myles Wagner).